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GOLDEN V. SM ENERGY COMPANY AND THE QUESTION OF 
WHETHER AN AREA OF MUTUAL INTEREST COVERING OIL 





Clauses providing for an “Area of Mutual Interest” (“AMI”) are 
common features on agreements between oil and gas lessees, including joint 
operating agreements and various other agreements under which lessees 
agree to share in the exploration for, and production of oil and gas.  AMI 
clauses typically provide that if one party to the agreement acquires an oil 
and gas interest it is required to offer to convey, or in some cases, simply 
convey, a portion of that interest to the other parties to the agreement.  This 
Article will begin with a description of AMIs, including a description of 
two types:  the Standard AMI and the Override AMI.  This Article will also 
include a discussion of why the AMI is used.  It will discuss the 
requirements for an AMI’s validity under the Statute of Frauds and the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, and discuss the question of whether the AMI is 
binding on successors and assigns, beginning with the requirement that such 
successors and assigns must have actual or constructive notice of the AMI, 
and then it will address the question of whether an AMI is a covenant 
running with the land.  Finally, it will analyze the recent North Dakota 
Supreme Court case of Golden v. SM Energy Company regarding the 
question of whether a successor to an agreement containing an AMI 
otherwise agreed to be bound by the terms thereof. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An Area of Mutual Interest (“AMI”) is an agreement among a group of 
parties that describes an area of land and provides that, if any of the parties 
acquire an oil and gas interest1 located in that area, the other party or parties 
to the AMI will have the option to share in that interest.  There is a wide 
range in the amount of land that may be covered by an AMI.  As one 
authority notes, “[a]n AMI may be a small ‘buffer zone’ around the edge of 
the contract area covered by a joint operating agreement, or if agreed to in 
anticipation of a large seismic shoot, it may be hundreds of square miles in 
 
1. There are various types of oil and gas interests, including:  (1) the interest of a lessee 
under and oil and gas lease, which is often referred to as a working interest, see PATRICK H. 
MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS 1147 
(15th ed. 2012) [hereinafter, WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS]; (2) the 
interest in the minerals, which may be owned by the owner of the fee simple interest in the land, 
or may be severed and owned separately, see id. at 606-07; and (3) various types of royalty 
interests, including:  (a) the royalty reserved under an oil and gas lease, see id. at 922; (b) a non-
participating royalty that is created out of a fee mineral interest, which does not include the right 
to grant an oil and gas lease, and does not participate in the bonus or rentals payable under a lease, 
see id at 670; and (c) an overriding royalty that is in addition to the royalty reserved by the lessor 
under an oil and gas lease, see id at 726.  Agreements under which a party has a right to acquire 
oil and gas leases or other interests held by another party, generally by drilling wells, may also be 
considered oil and gas interests; the most common of these is referred to as a “farmout 
agreement.”  See id. at 358-59.  Herein, unless otherwise indicated, the term “oil and interests” 
will be used to refer to all of these types of interests. 
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area.”2  Generally, when parties enter into an AMI, they are contemplating 
the acquisition of oil and gas leases within the specified area.  However, 
AMIs may also, intentionally or inadvertently, cover the acquisition of 
other types of oil and gas interests.3  AMIs have long been a feature of oil 
and gas operations in the United States, including operations in North 
Dakota,4 and there have been many articles and papers devoted, in whole or 
in part, to discussing AMIs and their application.5 
The purpose of this article is to:  (1) describe the AMI’s terms; (2) 
explain why it is used; (3) address two fundamental requirements for its 
validity, compliance with the Statute of Frauds, and the Rule Against 
Perpetuities; and (4) address in some detail the issue of when the terms of 
an AMI are binding on successors and assigns.  This Article will focus on 
North Dakota law and will refer to sources of that law whenever they are 
available.  It should also be noted, however, that cases from other 
jurisdictions will be cited where North Dakota authority is not available. 
Such cases will provide additional support for North Dakota’s position, 
provide examples that may not be available from North Dakota authority, or 
contrast a different approach that may be taken in other jurisdictions. 
II. THE TWO TYPES OF AMIS 
In preparing this article, I determined that AMIs may actually be 
divided into two types, which will be referred to herein as:  (1) the Standard 
AMI; and (2) the Override AMI.  The reason for this division is that, as will 
be discussed below, while the two types have much in common, the 
Override AMI differs from the Standard AMI in some fairly significant 
 
2. Terry I. Cross, The Ties that Bind:  Preemptive Rights and Restraints on Alienation that 
Commonly Burden Oil and Gas Properties, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 193, 215 (1999) 
[hereinafter Cross]. 
3. Id. at 217, noting:  
[E]ven though AMIs are typically entered into at a time when oil and gas leases are 
being acquired, the language of the AMI is usually broad enough to include almost 
any acquisition.  Mineral fees, farmouts and subleases usually are meant to be covered, 
since like a lease acquisition, they are exploration opportunities.  But is the acquisition 
of producing properties covered?  What about overriding royalties?  Typical AMI 
language will require a party to share any acquisition, but if the issue is raised at the 
drafting stage, parties usually agree to exclude producing properties. 
4. Anita Gefreh Himebaugh, An Overview of Oil and Gas Contracts in the Williston Basin, 
59 N.D. L. REV. 7, 32 (1983) [hereinafter Himebaugh]. 
5. See, e.g., Allen D. Cummings, Old AMIs—New Problems, ANN. ERNEST E. SMITH OIL, 
GAS & MINERAL L. INST. (2006); Scott Lansdown, Recent Challenges to Area of Mutual Interest 
Agreements; ANN. ERNEST E. SMITH OIL, GAS & MINERAL LAW INST. (2002); Cross, supra note 
2, at 215; Matthew A. Thanheiser, Area of Mutal Interest Clauses and Agreements, ANN. OIL, 
GAS & MINERAL L. INST. (1992) [hereinafter Thanheiser]; Dante L. Zarlengo, Area of Mutual 
Interest Clauses Regarding Oil and Gas Properties:  Analysis, Drafting, and Procedure, ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. (1983). 
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respects.  It is interesting to note that insofar as I have been able to 
determine, none of the authorities that have discussed AMI’s over the years 
have recognized the differences between the Standard AMI and the 
Override AMI.6  In fact, I confess that the distinction between the two types 
of AMIs was not noted in my earlier work on AMIs, and I only identified it 
while working on this Article.  I apologize if there are authorities I may 
have overlooked, that did, in fact, recognize these differences. 
A. THE STANDARD AMI 
Initially, it should be noted that AMIs are typically not entered into in 
isolation. Instead, they are generally incorporated in other agreements 
covering a venture between parties to exploit oil and gas resources, such as 
an exploration agreement,7 a type of agreement that is somewhat less well 
defined in the oil and gas industry than some other types of agreements.  As 
one authority notes: 
A variety of agreements are often loosely referred to as exploration 
agreements and participation agreements.  One type of contract 
commonly designated an exploration agreement permits a 
company to conduct geophysical exploration over a specified area 
and to select a specified amount of acreage within this area once 
the exploration has been concluded . . . Farmouts in which one 
party agrees to assign an interest in leased acreage in exchange for 
another party’s drilling one or more test wells may also be called 
exploration agreements.8 
It should be noted that the standard form of Joint Operating Agreement 
(“JOA”), which is the agreement that parties typically enter into to conduct 
joint oil and gas operations,9 does not contain an AMI provision,10 except 
 
6. See, e.g., supra note 5.  One of the authorities does note that an agreement may contain 
both the standard AMI provisions and the requirement for the grant of an overriding royalty.  See 
Cross, supra note 2, at 216. 
7. See Zarlengo, supra note 5, at 838-39 (“An area of mutual interest clause is commonly 
used in contracts pertaining to an area wherein little exploration has previously occurred.  The 
contract itself usually provides for exploration by drilling of one or more exploratory wells, by 
geophysical operations, or by other geologic and scientific means.”).  See also Himebaugh, supra 
note 4, at 32.  AMIs may also be included in Joint Operating Agreements, Gary B. Conine, 
Property Provisions of the Operating Agreement—Interpretation, Validity and Enforceability, 19 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1263, 1345 (1988) [hereinafter Conine], and farmout agreements; see John S. 
Lowe, Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements, 41 SW. L.J. 759, 844-46 (1987). 
8. 3 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEX. LAW OF OIL & GAS, § 16.4[B] (2d 
ed. 2013).  For a detailed description of exploration agreements, see Karen E. Lynch, Diagram of 
an Exploration Agreement:  Legal and Practical Documentation Pointers and Participants, 43 
ROCKY MTN. L. INST. 17-1 (1997). 
9. See John R. Reeves & J. Matthew Thompson, The Development of the Model Form 
Operating Agreement:  An Interpretive Accounting, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 211, 213 (2001) (“The 
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for a very limited clause governing the renewal and extension of leases.11  
AMIs are, however, sometimes added to JOAs.12  Where an AMI is not 
added to a JOA the parties thereto do not have the right to share in leases 
acquired by one of the other parties, other than those which fall within the 
renewal and extension clause, even if they are within the area covered by 
the JOA.13 
Although there is no standard “model form” of AMI,14 and there is a 
wide variety in the types of AMI agreements, virtually all of what will be 
referred to herein as Standard AMIs contain certain key terms:  (1) a 
description of the area covered; (2) a provision that if any party to the AMI 
acquires an oil and gas interest within the AMI,15 they will provide a notice 
to the other parties that includes a description of the interest and the 
consideration paid by the acquiring party in obtaining it;16 (3) a provision 
that the other parties have the option, but typically not the obligation, to 
acquire their proportionate part of the acquired interest by giving notice of 
 
American Association of Petroleum Landmen (“AAPL”) Form 610 Model Form Operating 
Agreement has been in use in the oil and gas industry in one form or another since 1956.  The 
various versions of the Model Form Operating Agreement continue to be widely used.”). 
10. See Cross, supra, note 2, at 216; Conine, supra note 7, at 1345.  But see Kinkcaid v. 
Western Operating Co., 890 P.2d 249, 253 (Colo. App. 1994) (holding that a JOA was ambiguous 
as to whether it covered subsequently acquired leases, and upholding the trial court’s finding that 
the evidence demonstrated that it was the parties’ intent that it do so).  Interestingly, the court 
noted that the party claiming that the JOA did not cover newly acquired leases had cited “two law 
review articles” indicating that a standard form of JOA does not create an AMI unless the parties 
expressly provide that it does.  Id. at 252.  The court does not identify the law review articles, but 
it may be reasonably speculated that they were the Cross and Conine articles.  In any event, the 
court held that since the articles were not cited in the trial court decision, they could not be 
considered on appeal. 
11. See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of Petroleum Landmen Form 610-1989 Model Form Operating 
Agreement, art.VIII.B.  In Stewart v. Hauptman, No. 04-547 2007 WL 1977763 at *5 (Mont. 
2007), the Montana Supreme Court ruled that the terms of an AMI conflicted with the renewal and 
extension provision of the JOA and held that the terms of the AMI prevailed because of the 
provision concerning conflicts in the agreement containing the AMI and the behavior of the party 
that sought to avoid the AMI.  Id. at *5. 
12. See Thanheiser, supra note 5, at 4. 
13. See Clovelly Oil Co. v. Midstates Petro. Co., 112 So.3d 187, 196 (La. 2013).  In that case 
the non-acquiring party argued that the JOA would automatically cover new leases. The court 
noted that this would render the clause of the JOA allowing the parties the option to participate in 
renewal or extension leases virtually without effect.  Id. at 195.  The court also noted that this 
result would, unlike the standard AMI clause, deprive the parties of the option to participate, or 
not participate in the acquired leases, and that, as a result “[t]he JOA parties would have no 
reasonable way to manage or predict the risks they might incur after they entered into a JOA with 
another party.”  Id. at 196. 
14. Cross, supra note 2, at 217. 
15. Herein the term “AMI” will sometimes be used to refer to the area covered by the AMI. 
16. In Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Chorney Oil Co., 335 F. Supp. 59, 64-65 (D. Wyo. 
1971), the court held that, where the AMI only required that a party “shall promptly notify,” the 
other party of the acquisition of an interest, written notification was not required, and that notice 
by telephone, followed by the provision of maps showing the location of the acquired interest, was 
sufficient. 
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their election to participate in the acquisition17 and paying their 
proportionate part of the consideration paid by the acquiring party18 within 
a specified period of time;19 and (4) a specification of the proportion of the 
interest a party has the right to acquire in the oil and gas interest.20  More 
elaborate AMIs may include additional bells and whistles, such as the form 
of assignment to be used by the acquiring party in assigning the interest to 
the parties that exercise their option. 
A sample form of a Standard AMI provision is attached in the 
Appendix to this Article.  Consistent with the fact that AMI’s are typically 
included in broader agreements, this AMI is not set up as a standalone 
agreement, although it could be fairly easily modified to constitute one.  It 
should also be noted that this provision is offered as an illustration, and not 
as an ideal example, since many of the specific provisions of an AMI will 
be dictated by the specific circumstances of the parties’ deal, including the 
instrument in which the AMI is contained, and/or the instrument or 
instruments associated with it. 
 
17. In Lyle Cashion Co. v. McKendrick, 204 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1953), the court held 
that although the non-acquiring party had not formally exercised its option to participate in an 
acquisition covered by an AMI, his intent to exercise was evidenced by the parties’ actions, and in 
addition, that the acquiring party, by accepting the benefits of the non-acquiring party in 
developing the acreage, was estopped to deny that the non-acquiring party has elected to 
participate in the acquisition.  The court quoted a rather tart observation by the trial court that: 
“This case portrays just another oil deal in which the party in whose name the leases are taken, 
after the well has been successfully brought in, would like to relieve himself of an encumbrance 
he was glad to use in putting the deal together.” 
18. Acquisition costs generally include not just the amount paid for the interest, but also 
“brokerage fees or commissions, costs of recording, and title curative expenses.”  Himebaugh, 
supra note 4, at 33.  Himebaugh notes that the definition of acquisition costs should clarify 
whether such costs include the cost of acquiring title opinions on the property.  At times, a 
substantial dispute can arise as to what acquisition costs consist of, for example, in J-O’B 
Operating Co. v. Newmont Oil Co., 560 So.2d 852 (La. App. 1990), the party that acquired a 
sublease of an oil and gas lease from the State of Louisiana claimed part of the consideration for 
that acquisition was its agreement to conduct a seismic program, even though this was not 
expressly stated in the sublease, and that as a result of the failure of some parties to agree to 
participate in the seismic program, they were not entitled to share in the sublease.  The court found 
that:  (1) the agreement to conduct the seismic program was part of the consideration for the 
sublease and; (2) the parties that had refused to participate in the seismic program had lost their 
right to participate in the acquisition of the sublease.  Id. at 858-59.  The court held, “The AMI 
agreement does not allow an electing party the right to contest the necessity for or the extent of 
any consideration paid by the acquirer for a lease or other mineral interest.”  Id. at 859. 
19. In Heritage Res., Inc. v. Anschutz Corp., 689 S.W.2d 952, 955 (Tex. App. 1985), the 
court held that, where an AMI was silent on the time that a party had to respond to an offer 
thereunder, a reasonable time would be implied, and that what was a reasonable time would be 
determined based on the facts at the time the parties entered into the AMI. 
20. In many cases, this proportion will be identical to the ownership of the parties in the 
existing oil and gas leases in the area.  In other cases, for example where the AMI is included in a 
farmout type arrangement, the ownership will be based on the interests that will result in the 
farmee earning oil and gas leases, generally by drilling wells. 
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B. THE OVERRIDE AMI 
The Override AMI presents many of the same issues as the 
arrangement described in the preceding section, but it also differs from that 
arrangement in certain key aspects.  The basic characteristic of the Override 
AMI is that it gives one of the parties to the AMI the right to be assigned an 
overriding royalty in the acquired oil and gas interest.  As Professors 
Kramer and Martin note: 
Typically . . . the term overriding royalty is used to describe a 
royalty carved out of the working interest created by an oil and gas 
lease.  Most frequently it is created subsequent to a lease by grant 
or reservation.  For example, the original lessee may transfer the 
leasehold, or some part thereof, retaining a 1/16 overriding 
royalty—an override created by reservation—or the lessee may 
transfer a 1/16 overriding royalty for a valuable consideration—an 
override created by grant.21 
Overriding royalties are a form of compensation used in various ways 
in the oil and gas industry.  They are, for example, a very common feature 
of farmout agreements.22  Another way that an overriding royalty may be 
used is as compensation for a party that develops an oil and gas 
“prospect.”23  In some cases, a party may develop a prospect but not have 
actually taken any leases in the prospect area; in other cases, some leases 
may have been acquired, but the parties anticipate acquiring additional 
leases.  The Override AMI provides that one or more of the parties will 
receive the agreed-upon overriding royalty on all oil and gas leases (and 
perhaps other oil and gas interests) acquired in the future within the AMI.24 
The three critical ways that the Override AMI differs from the Standard 
AMI is that first, they are generally one sided; only one party has the right 
to acquire the overriding royalty in oil and gas interests acquired by the 
other party.  Second, the party with the right to be assigned the overriding 
 
21. 2 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 
418 (2012). 
22. See Lowe, supra note 7, at 829-32. 
23. “Overriding royalty interests are frequently used to compensate the geologist who 
developed the prospect, the landman who took the lease, or others who performed service for the 
Lessee and have helped to structure a drilling venture.”  Edward M. Fenk, Are Overriding Royalty 
Interests Becoming the Clay Pigeons of the Texas Oil and Gas Industry?  The Assignor-Assignee 
Relationship after Sasser v. Dantex Oil & Gas, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 231, 233, n.19 (1999). 
24. An Override AMI was, in fact, the type of AMI that was involved in the case that is the 
focus of this article, Golden v. SM Energy Co., 2013 ND 17, 826 N.W.2d 610.  See also Mountain 
West Mines Inc. v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 376 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (D. Wyo. 2005), aff’d in part, 
reversed in part and remanded, 470 F.3d 937 (10th Cir. 2006); Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 
649 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App. 1983). 
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royalty is not required to pay any portion of the consideration paid by the 
acquiring party for the interest from which the overriding royalty is to be 
granted.  Third, because there is no obligation to pay for the overriding 
royalty to be granted, the AMI will usually provide that the overriding 
royalty is to be granted automatically; that is, there is no option to acquire 
as is provided for in the Standard AMI.25 
III. WHY IS THE AMI USED? 
Typically, Standard AMIs are used to address one or both of two 
concerns.  The first concern results from the fact that, in many cases when 
parties enter into an agreement for exploring and developing an area, they 
will not have leased all of the area in question; in fact, in some cases a large 
proportion of the area, or even the entire area, may be unleased.26  
Generally, parties will be far more willing to expend funds on a seismic 
survey and/or drilling exploratory wells if they know they will have the 
option of sharing in any acquisitions of oil and gas interests in the subject 
area.27 
Although the above concern is probably the most significant 
motivation for the parties agreeing to an AMI, there may be a second set of 
concerns that relate to the operations that the parties anticipate conducting 
after interests have been acquired and production has been obtained.  These 
concerns relate to there being a non-uniform interest throughout the area of 
operations.  They can include potential conflicts of interest among the 
parties in accomplishing the orderly exploitation of the area, as well as 
problems relating to the facilities that may serve areas having a differing 
ownership.28 
 
25. The AMIs involved in the cases cited in the previous footnote all had these three 
characteristics.  
26. This may be the case, for example, where the parties are entering into an agreement to 
jointly conduct seismic operations on a large area. 
27. “The purpose of an area of mutual interest clause is to provide that the parties jointly 
funding the exploration of the area will own the benefits of the exploration activities jointly and 
proportionately.”  Zarlengo, supra note 5, at 839; see also Clovelly Oil Co. v. Midstates 
Petroleum Co., 112 So.3d 187, 195 (La. 2013) (“The AMI clause assures participants that the 
developmental opportunities in the area will be owned by them in the same percentages as the 
initial risk dollars are borne, preventing one of the participants from using the jointly acquired 
data to acquire leases in the AMI for its sole account.”).  It should also be noted that, under most 
exploration agreements, one party will be designated as operator, and actually will conduct any 
seismic and/or drilling operations conducted under the terms of the agreement.  Since the operator 
will generally have the first access to the information obtained, the other parties will be 
legitimately concerned that the operator will have an unfair advantage in acquiring oil and gas 
leases and other interests; thus, they will require an AMI to protect their ability to share in such 
acquisitions. 
28. See Cross, supra note 2, at 220 (“Smooth operation of an AMI over any length of time 
requires a ‘maintenance of uniform interest’ provision to be in place.”).  These are basically the 
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The concerns that motivate the Override AMI are similar to the first set 
of concerns described above.  Basically, a party that develops a prospect 
will want to insure that it receives its override on all of the leases that are 
eventually taken in the prospect, not just those that are in existence at the 
time the deal is entered into.  Indeed, in those cases where a party has 
developed a prospect, but no leases have been taken, the Override AMI is 
the only way that party will receive its compensation. 
IV. GENERAL REQUIREMENT FOR VALIDITY 
Since an AMI is an instrument that creates rights in real property it is 
subject to the rules which the law imposes for such instruments to be valid.  
This section will discuss two of those requirements: first, compliance with 
the statue of frauds, and second, compliance with the rule against 
perpetuities.  Two issues that will not be discussed in detail concerning the 
validity of AMIs are whether they constitute an unreasonable restraint on 
alienation or an unreasonable restraint on trade.  As Dante Zarlengo 
concluded in his early article on AMIs generally used in the oil and gas 
industry, they should not constitute either an unreasonable restraint on 
alienation or an unreasonable restraint on trade.29 
A. STATUE OF FRAUDS 
Since an AMI is an agreement to transfer an interest in real property, it 
will generally be subject to the statute of frauds applicable in the state 
where the property is located.30  Compliance with the statute of frauds 
requires that the description of the land covered “must be such that would 
enable a competent surveyor to find the land in question from the 
 
same concerns that underlie the inclusion in JOAs of a “Maintenance of Uniform Interest Clause,” 
under which a part may only sell its interest in the area covered by the JOA if such sale covers:  
“1. the entire interest of the party in all Oil and Gas Leases, Oil and Gas Interests, wells, 
equipment and production; or 2. an equal undivided percent of the party's present interest in all Oil 
and Gas Leases, Oil and Gas Interests, wells, equipment and production in the Contract Area.”  
Am. Ass’n of Petroleum Landmen, supra note 11, at 15.  As one authority has noted,   
The requirement of uniformity is imposed to insure both administrative efficiency and 
viability of the overall scheme of joint operations.  Unless the fractional interest of the 
parties remains uniform, as initially established in the provisions of the operating 
agreement, the operator will be confronted with an increasingly complex pattern of 
ownership which varies by geographic area. 
Conine, supra note 7, at 1327. 
29. Zarlengo, supra note 5, at 851-55. 
30. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-04 (2013) (“The following contracts are invalid, 
unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party to 
be charged, or by the party’s agent: . . . 3. An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than 
one year, or for the sale, of real property, or of an interest therein.”). 
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memorandum or from references made in the memorandum.”31  As a 
general rule, “the description is sufficient if the reference to the property in 
the deed is such that the court, by pursuing an inquiry based upon the words 
of reference, is able to identify the particular property to the exclusion of all 
other property.”32  Parole evidence may not be introduced to supplement the 
description of property covered by an AMI.33  The Texas case of Westland 
Oil Development Corporation v. Gulf Oil Corporation34 provides useful 
examples of what descriptions will and will not be sufficient under the 
statute of frauds.  The instrument in that case contained two descriptions of 
land.  The first referred to leases affecting the lands covered by a farmout.  
The farmout itself described specific sections of land, and the court found 
that this description was sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute of 
frauds.35  However, the court found that the second description, which 
referred to “lands within the area of the farmout acreage,” was not 
sufficient, noting:  “[w]hen resort to extrinsic evidence is proper, it should 
be used only for the purpose of identifying the land with reasonable 
certainty from the data in the memorandum, and not for the purpose of 
supplying its location or description.”36 
Of course, the very nature of AMIs mean that they do not describe 
specific tracts of land that are being conveyed or are going to be conveyed.  
Instead, they describe an area within which a portion of an interest in a tract 
or tracts of land will be required to be conveyed in the future if a party to 
the AMI acquires an interest therein.  I am not aware of any cases in which 
a party to an AMI attempted to claim that it did not satisfy the statute of 
frauds on the grounds that it did not describe the specific acreage or leases 
to be conveyed.  It does appear, however, that this type of argument was 
made in the Texas case of Long v. Rim Operating, Incorporated,37 with 
regard to a provision in a joint operating agreement that required that a 
party that did not participate in an operation that was required to maintain a 
 
31. Klipfel v. Brandenburger, 156 N.W.2d 774, 777 (N.D. 1968).  See also Crowder v. Tri-C 
Res., Inc., 821 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tex. App. 1991) (“No part of the memorandum is more essential 
than the description of the land.”). 
32. First Sec. Bank v. Enyart, 439 N.W.2d 801, 807 (N.D. 1989), (quoting State v. 
Rosenquist, 51 N.W. 767, 778 (N.D. 1952)). 
33. See Crowder, 821 S.W.2d at 396 (The memorandum “must be complete within itself in 
every material detail and contain all of the essential elements of the agreement so that the contract 
can be ascertained from the writings without resorting to oral testimony.”).  Parole evidence is 
also generally not admissible to prove the other terms of an AMI.  See, e.g., Petrocana, Inc. v. 
Margo, Inc., 577 So. 2d 274, 278 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (Parole evidence not admissible to show 
agreement of the parties to extend an AMI beyond the period provided for in the writing). 
34. 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982). 
35. Westland Oil, 637 S.W.2d at 909. 
36. Id. at 910. 
37. 345 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. App. 2011). 
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lease relinquish all of its interest in that lease to the parties that conducted 
the operation.  The court agreed that, at the time the operating agreement 
was executed, the parties did not know the lease or leases to which this 
requirement would be applied. But, citing Westland, the court held that 
since the application of the provision in question was limited to the area 
covered by the JOA, that description was sufficient.38  Since Westland did 
involve an AMI, the court’s citation of that case suggests it would also find 
that the fact an AMI did not describe specific tracts of land to be conveyed 
would not be sufficient to invalidate the AMI under the statute of frauds. 
The requirement for an adequate description of the property covered by 
an AMI can, however, sometimes lead to problems.  Because the parties are 
generally attempting to describe a broad area that may be of interest, based 
on the results of their exploration activities, they often will not feel that 
great precision in the description of the area is required.39  As one authority, 
describing AMI agreements used in North Dakota indicated:  “[t]he A.M.I. 
is identified by a map or plat attached as an exhibit clearly indicating the 
outline of the area.”40  As another authority has noted, however: 
Often, these maps do not contain field notes or metes and bounds 
descriptions or even legible names of leagues, labors or surveys 
which would enable one to locate these areas on the ground by 
survey.  In many cases, such practice renders these agreements 
unenforceable because of failure to comply with the statute of 
frauds.41 
As the case of Palmer v. Fuqua42 illustrates, some courts have been 
willing to avoid invalidating an AMI under the statute of frauds, even 
though a strict application of the law would likely require them to do so.  
Fuqua involved a limited partnership that was formed to acquire oil and gas 
leases.  The partnership agreement provided that “any property or properties 
acquired in the area of interest owned by this Partnership shall first be 
offered to the Limited Partner . . . .”43  Noting that, while the “farthest 
 
38. Id. at 89. 
39. The case of Lyle Cashion Co. v. McKendrick, 204 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1953) provides 
an example of how large an AMI may be.  In that case, the covered interests acquired were 
“within a radius of ten (10) miles of the well site” for the initial well drilled under the agreement 
between the parties.  Although not a precise description of boundaries by sections or metes and 
bounds, this does describe an area that could be ascertained by a survey on the ground.  
Presumably, this would be sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. 
40. Himebaugh, supra note 4, at 32.  See also Crowder v. Tri-C Res., Inc., 821 S.W.2d 393, 
395 (Tex. App. 1991); J-O’B Operating Co. v. Newmont Oil Co., 560 So.2d 852, 853 (La. Ct. 
App. 1990) (both cases refer to an AMI that was outlined in red on a plat). 
41. Thanheiser, supra note 5, at 7. 
42. 641 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981). 
43. Palmer, 641 F.2d at 1149. 
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reaches” of this description might not be clear, the court held that “at the 
very least, the area of interest includes properties contiguous to lands 
owned by the partnership.”44  Responding to the argument that the 
agreement violated the statute of frauds, the court acknowledged that the 
statute of frauds applied to oil and gas leases, assignments of leases, options 
to acquire leases and contracts to assign and sell leases.45  The court found, 
however, that the statute did not apply to the agreement before it, stating 
that the agreement, “was simply a statement of fiduciary obligation in a 
partnership agreement[,]”46 and that the operative language of the 
agreement specified “requires a partner to make an offer under certain 
circumstances—it is not the offer itself.”47 
One authority has disagreed with the result in Fuqua, arguing that the 
statute of frauds should generally be applicable to AMIs: 
It does not impose a great burden on the parties to require them to 
give a specific description of the areas to be covered by the mutual 
interest clause.  The public policy to be served by requiring a 
definite statement of the duties and obligations of the parties and, 
even more importantly, of their successors in interest, certainly 
out-weighs the desirability of enforcing an indefinite area of 
mutual interest clause.  If the area of mutual interest clause is not 
enforceable, the court may resort to other remedies in order to 
accomplish a just end.  To distort the terms of the area of mutual 
interest clause and unnecessarily weaken the Statute of Frauds in 
accomplishing these ends is far less desirable.48 
Whether one accepts this argument, it is certainly the case that, for 
attorneys involved in drafting AMIs, the effort involved in ensuring that it 
contains an accurate description is minor compared to the cost and risk of 
 
44. Id. at 1154. 
45. Id. at 1158.  
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 1158-59.  The court also based its ruling on the fact that the statute of frauds 
generally did not apply to partnerships or joint ventures in which the subject matter is land, and 
that the action before it was not an action to enforce the AMI, but rather was “an action to impress 
a constructive trust upon property as a remedy for the breach of a fiduciary obligation.  The 
imposition of a constructive trust is not prevented by the Statute of Frauds.”  Id. at 1159. 
48. Zarlengo, supra note 5, at 845.  Discussing Fuqua, Zarlengo noted that: 
[T]he courts have been somewhat more willing to enforce provisions contained in 
partnership agreements having the same practical effect as an area of mutual interest 
clause, and notwithstanding the fact that some exploration agreements might be 
considered for many purposes to be partnerships with respect to the fiduciary and 
related obligations of the parties. 
Id. at n.10. 
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incurring litigation over whether the description meets the requirements of 
the statute of frauds. 
B. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
The Rule Against Perpetuities, under North Dakota law, states: “A 
contingent property interest is invalid unless:  (a) When the interest is 
created, it is certain to vest or terminate no later than twenty-one years after 
the death of an individual then alive; or (b) The interest either vests or 
terminates within ninety years after its creation.”49  The rule has been held 
applicable to oil and gas leases,50 and it is reasonably clear that, technically, 
it would also apply to AMIs.51  However, as I observed more than a decade 
ago: 
It should be noted that as a general rule, if perpetuities issues arise 
with regard to an AMI, it will be the result of a mistake in drafting 
. . . [P]arties generally enter into an AMI in order to facilitate the 
orderly operation of a particular area during the exploration period 
of the applicable agreement, and will not wish to bind themselves 
to share an acquired interest beyond that period.  It would be 
unusual for this term to exceed the base twenty-one year period 
provided for in the rule against perpetuities.52 
Of course, in the oil and gas industry, as in all areas of the law, 
mistakes in drafting will occur.  In some cases, parties may simply forget to 
include a term for the AMI, raising perpetuities issues.53  In addition, if the 
term of the AMI is tied, for example, to the term of an operating agreement, 
a perpetuities issue may be created since operating agreements generally 
provide that they will be in effect either for the life of the leases covered 
thereby or for so long as there is production from or operations on the land 
 
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-27.1(a)-(b) (2013). 
50. See Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655, 659-60 (N.D. 1986). 
51. See Conine, supra note 7, at 1376 (“the area of mutual interest clause . . . seek[s] to 
assure the conveyance of interests at a point in the future which may exceed the limitations 
prescribed in the rule [against perpetuities].”). 
52. Lansdown, supra note 5, at 5-6.  See also Cross, supra note 2, at 220, noting: 
In most instances, AMIs serve their purpose if they have a term of five to eight years.  
Even if no leases are owned initially, this length of term allows for the acquisition of 
seismic options, the exercise of the options, primary terms in leases of at least three 
years, plus a generous cushion for renewals and extensions of those leases. 
53. It appears likely that this is what occurred in First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sidwell 
Corp., 678 P.2d 118 (Kan. 1984), and Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 258 S.W.2d 391 
(Tex. App. 1953). 
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covered by the agreement.54  In either case, this can extend beyond the 
perpetuities period. 
It should also be noted, however, that in the context of oil and gas 
instruments, including AMIs, “there appears to be a trend to relax the 
inflexible application of the rule and to give effect to the intent of the 
parties.”55  One way that this has been accomplished is demonstrated in 
First National Bank & Trust Company v. Sidwell Corporation,56 where the 
court rejected the argument that the rule applied to invalidate an AMI, 
holding, “[t]he [AMI] did not involve the vesting of future interests in real 
property and did not constitute a restraint upon the alienation of that 
property.  The rule against perpetuities does not apply to the purely 
contractual obligations involved here.”57 
Although it does not appear that courts in North Dakota have had 
occasion to review the applicability of the rule against perpetuities to AMIs, 
in Nantt v. Puckett Energy Company,58 the court rejected a challenge to a 
group of top leases based on the rule.  A “top lease” is “[a] lease granted by 
a landowner during the existence of a recorded mineral lease which is to 
become effective if and when the existing lease expires or is terminated.”59  
In Nantt, the top leases required that once the underlying leases expired, the 
lessee was required to pay an additional consideration for the top leases to 
become effective, and the lessee had issued drafts for the second payment.60  
Since an oil and gas lease typically provides that it will be effective for so 
long as there is production from the leased premises, it is clear that the 
underlying lease may remain in effect beyond the perpetuities period, and 
that the top lease may therefore become effective beyond that period.  The 
court in Nantt, however, rejected the argument that the top leases were 
invalid under the rule against perpetuities, accepting the trial court’s 
 
54. See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of Petroleum Landmen Form 610-1989 Model Form Operating 
Agreement, art. XIII. 
55. Conine, supra note 7, at 1376. 
56. 678 P.2d 118 (Kan. 1984). 
57. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 678 P.2d at 126-27.  In Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 610 
P.2d 772 (Okla. 1980), the court found that the rule was not applicable to a right of first refusal 
contained in an operating agreement.  The court initially noted that the rule would not apply if the 
rights created under the preemptive provisions were merely contractual, but held that, since rights 
were created with regard to oil and gas leases, which were interests in real property, the rule had 
to be considered.  Id. at 774.  However, the court went on to hold that right of first refusal did not 
violate the rule, since it was limited by the terms of the operating agreement, which, in turn was 
limited by the term of the lease.  Id. at 775-76.  It should be noted, however, that this specific 
reasoning would not apply to AMIs, since they provide a right to acquire interests in future leases 
and thus would not be limited by the terms of an existing lease. 
58. 382 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1986). 
59. WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 1, at 1073. 
60. 382 N.W.2d at 657.  
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determination that “the options for the top leases . . . were exercised by the 
immediate issuance and delivery of the second drafts for the additional 
bonus, conditioned only upon ‘approval and acceptance of titles’ i.e. 
expiration of the underlying leases . . . without extension by drilling or 
production.”61  The court’s reasoning on this issue is unclear.  If, in fact, the 
top leases were “conditioned” upon acceptance of title, which consisted of 
the expiration of the underlying leases and such underlying leases could be 
in effect beyond the expiration of the primary term, why was the rule of 
perpetuities not applicable?  In any event, Nantt suggests, like the Kansas 
court in Sidwell, that North Dakota courts will be sympathetic to arguments 
that seek to avoid the application of the rule against perpetuities to AMIs. 
V. IS THE AMI BINDING ON SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS? 
In order to fully understand the nature of the question of whether an 
AMI is binding upon successors and assigns, it is initially necessary to 
address the question: successors and assigns to what?  Broadly speaking 
there are two answers to this question:  (1) successors and assigns to the 
AMI agreement itself; and (2) successors and assigns to some agreement 
and/or interest that is related in some way to the AMI.  Generally speaking, 
the answer in the first situation is, if an AMI, or the agreement containing 
an AMI is assigned, it will be binding upon the assignee, unless the 
agreement contains an express provision to the contrary, since the very 
nature of an assignment of an agreement is that a party assumes all of the 
rights and obligations thereunder.62 
The second type of situation could arise as follows:  Company A and 
Company B enter into an Exploration Agreement that includes an AMI.  
Company A acquires leases on a substantial block of acreage that is located 
within the AMI which, pursuant to the terms of the AMI, it shares with 
Company B.  Subsequently, Company B conveys its entire interest in the 
leases to Company C, but does not purport to assign its rights and 
obligations under the Exploration Agreement.  Thereafter, Company C 
acquires leases on unleased acreage located within the AMI.  Company A 
claims that, under the terms of the AMI, Company C is obligated to offer 
Company A its proportionate part of the leases under the terms of the AMI.  
 
61. Id. at 661.  The court noted a constructional preference against the application of the rule, 
and cited, as a second basis for its conclusion the “wait and see” or “second look” approach to 
perpetuities cases, noting that while the approach “is still evolving and is not yet a prevailing rule, 
it is a basic common sense approach to ‘perpetuities’ today.”  Id. 
62. The parties to an exploration agreement could certainly provide that the AMI portion of 
the agreement is not binding upon successors and assigns, possibly to make the agreement more 
“assignable” to parties that were interested in the prospect covered by the agreement, but did not 
want to be bound by an AMI; however, I have never encountered this. 
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Thus, the question remains whether the terms of the AMI are binding upon 
Company C by virtue of its acquisition of leases from Company B. 
Before addressing the legal aspects of this question, a word of warning 
is probably appropriate.  Cases involving this issue are virtually always far 
more involved and complex than the situation described above.  There are 
various reasons for this, but two significant factors include:  (1) the cases 
often involve a large number of parties and a correspondingly large number 
of transactions; and (2) the cases often involve arrangements that are more 
complex.  Perhaps the best example of this is the case most often cited with 
regard to AMIs, Westland Oil,63 which involved multiple letter agreements, 
farmouts, assignments and at least one operating agreement.64  Rather than 
attempt to describe these arrangements and their interaction, I will refer to 
Angus Earl McSwain’s article on the case, which contains detailed charts of 
the various agreements and their interactions.65 
While Westland may represent the “outer edge” of complexity that is 
involved in cases concerning AMIs, it is fair to say that most cases 
involving AMIs, and particularly the question of whether an AMI is binding 
upon successors, are far from simple.  Probably the simplest cases involve 
Override AMIs; other cases are likely to be more complex.  When 
discussing these cases, I will do my best to provide a description of the facts 
that are accurate but also simple enough to enable the reader to understand 
the case’s significance with regard to the issues discussed. 
A. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
As is the case with any instrument affecting real property, the question 
of whether an AMI is binding upon a successor in interest will initially 
depend upon whether the successor has actual or constructive notice 
thereof.  Initially, it should be noted that the AMI will be binding upon the 
parties thereto, and parties who have actual notice thereof, even if it is not 
recorded.66  However, if it is not properly recorded, an AMI would not be 
valid against a subsequent purchaser who took without actual notice.67 
One interesting aspect of issues concerning oil and gas title is, while 
parties have always been careful to insure that some instruments, such as 
leases and pooling agreements, are properly placed of record, for many 
years they tended to be less diligent about the recordation of other 
 
63. 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982). 
64. Westland Oil Dev. Corp., 637 S.W.2d at 904-06. 
65. Angus Earl McSwain, Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil:  New Uncertainties 
as to Scope of Title Search, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 629, 629-33 (1983).  
66. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-46 (2013). 
67. Id. 
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instruments, such as operating agreements, farmouts, and similar 
arrangements.68  As one authority has noted:  “[i]t is rare indeed for an AMI 
to be contained in a recorded agreement, and therefore they can easily be 
missed by someone in a hurry to buy and sell leases or to drill a well.”69  
This can raise the question of whether a reference to an unrecorded AMI in 
a recorded instrument is sufficient to place parties on notice of the existence 
of the AMI.  In Texas, this question was firmly answered in the affirmative 
in the case of Westland, in which the court held that parties were charged 
with notice of an AMI contained in a letter agreement that was referenced 
in an operating agreement to which a recorded assignment was recited to be 
subject.70  The dissent in Westland disagreed and argued that parties could 
not properly be charged with notice of the AMI in that situation, given that 
the reference in the recorded assignment was to an operating agreement, 
noting: 
[T]he function of an operating agreement is to explain in detail the 
operation between the various interests in the development of a 
tract for economical production of the minerals, not to establish 
interests of any kind.  Therefore, a reference to any conflict with 
an operating agreement might well have alerted a reasonably 
diligent purchaser to check the letter agreement if he was 
concerned with the operations, not for title reasons.71 
It is probably fair to say that Westland represented a fairly “absolutist” 
position on parties being charged notice.  As Angus Earl McSwain ably 
summarized the question faced by the Westland court: 
The important issue faced by the court dealt with the title search 
required of the vendee.  There are basically two choices:  (1) he 
must investigate every reference to every instrument; or (2) he is 
only bound to investigate those matters which reasonably appear 
to be title-related.72 
As indicated in Westland, the Texas Supreme Court adopted the first of 
these approaches.  McSwain basically agreed with the dissent in the case, 
 
68. See J. Robert Goldsmith, An Overview of Bankruptcy and Creditor’s Rights in Relation 
to the Texas Oil and Gas Industry, Advanced Oil Gas & Min. L. Course K-13 (1986) (“Most 
operating agreements are never recorded and, in fact, cannot be recorded because they lack 
acknowledgments.”).  More recently, parties have become more diligent about obtaining the 
protection of the recordation statutes.  For example, the 1989 version of the AAPL Operating 
Agreement is the first to include a memorandum that can be placed of record. 
69. Cummings, supra note 5, at 5-6. 
70. 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982). 
71. Id. at 912 (Wallace, J. dissenting). 
72. McSwain, supra note 65, at 642 (emphasis in original). 
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observing that, although the cases cited by the Supreme Court support the 
proposition that the purchaser is bound by references contained in 
documents in the chain of title.  “In all of those cases, however, the 
references are clearly to title-related documents concerning a title related 
matter.”73 
It should be noted that, whether one agrees with the dissent in Westland 
and McSwain, one advantage of the majority’s approach is that it will 
generally make it easy for parties to answer questions about notice, rather 
than having to do an intensely factual analysis of whether it was reasonable 
to charge parties with notice in a particular situation.  McSwain himself 
acknowledged that the approach he favored would involve a detailed factual 
analysis in which general principles may be of limited value.74  This 
substantially increases the likelihood that parties will engage in extended, 
and likely burdensome and expensive, litigation over whether the 
documentation in their case provided sufficient notice. 
North Dakota does follow the rule that “[o]ne who has knowledge of 
the facts sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry with regard to the 
existence of an unrecorded deed, and fails to make such inquiry, cannot 
claim protection as a bona fide purchaser under the recording act.”75  There 
does not, however, appear to be any North Dakota cases similar to Westland 
that address what in a recorded document would constitute sufficient notice 
of an unrecorded AMI.  Future cases will thus determine whether North 
Dakota moves towards the absolutist approach of the Westland majority or 
the case-by-case analysis advocated by McSwain and the Westland dissent. 
B. IS THE AMI A COVENANT THAT BINDS SUCCESSORS AND 
ASSIGNS? 
An AMI may be binding upon a successor or assign in two ways: first, 
if it is deemed to be a covenant running with the land, and second, if the 
successor or assign agrees to be bound.  As will be discussed below, it 
appears that some authorities actually consider the question of whether the 
AMI is deemed to be a covenant running with the land to be dispositive of 
the question of whether it is binding upon successors.  However, as the 
Golden case makes clear, this is not correct. 
 
73. Id. at 653. 
74. Id. at 645. 
75. Burlington N., Inc. v. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233, 238 (N.D. 1982). 
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1. Is the AMI a Covenant that Runs with the Land? 
In order for an obligation to be a covenant “running with the land,” 
there must be privity of estate between the assignor and the assignee and the 
obligation imposed by the AMI must “touch and concern” the land.76  The 
“touch and concern” requirement originated in England in Spencer’s Case, 
in which the court stated “if the thing to be done be merely collateral to the 
land and doth not touch or concern the Thing demised in any sort, there the 
assignee shall not be charged.”77 
The concept of running with the land is actually contained in the North 
Dakota statutes: 
Certain covenants contained in grants of estates in real property 
are appurtenant to such estates and pass with them so as to bind 
the assigns of the covenanter and to vest in the assigns of the 
covenantee in the same manner as if they personally had entered 
into them.  Such covenants are said to run with the land.78 
What is more, the statute provides that the only covenants that run with 
the land are those that the statute specifies, along with covenants that are 
incidental thereto;79 those are the covenants that are “for the direct benefit 
of the property or some part of it then in existence, run with the land.”80 
Although it did not involve an AMI covering oil and gas properties, 
Beeter v. Sawyer Disposal81 provides insight on the question of whether 
such an AMI would be considered a covenant running with the land in 
North Dakota.  That case involved a parcel of property that was conveyed 
for use as a municipal landfill.  The grantee agreed to pay the grantor six 
percent of the revenue derived from any expansion or extension of its 
operations; thus, the arrangement was similar to an Override AMI.  The 
property was subsequently conveyed and the original grantor claimed that 
the subsequent grantee was obligated to continue to make the six percent 
payment.  The trial court had held that the agreement to pay the six percent 
was not a covenant running with the land, but it was nevertheless binding 
upon the subsequent grantee based on the parties’ intent.82 
 
76. Cross, supra note 2, at 218. 
77. (1583) 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K. B.) 74. 
78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-24 (2013). 
79. Id. § 47-04-25. 
80. Id. § 47-04-26.  Those covenants include the covenant of warranty, the covenant for quite 
enjoyment, the covenant for further assurances on the part of the grantor and the covenant for the 
payment of rent taxes or assessments upon the land on the part of the grantee.  Id. 
81. 2009 ND 153, 771 N.W.2d 282. 
82. Beeter, 2009 ND 153, ¶ 7, 771 N.W.2d at 285. 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the holding of the trial 
court.  Initially, the court agreed with the conclusion of the trial court that 
the covenant in question did not run with the land, noting that if the 
covenant did not directly benefit the land as required by the statute, it was 
personal and enforceable only between the original parties to the deed.  
Further, the court noted that it was generally recognized that a covenant to 
pay for land in a particular way is personal.83  The court then stated: 
The covenant in the deed in this case requiring payment of six 
percent of gross revenues from waste disposal operations does not 
in any manner benefit the land.  It is a purely personal 
benefit . . . and appears, in fact, to be part of the consideration and 
payment for the land.84 
The court went on to reject the trial court’s conclusion that the covenant 
was nevertheless binding upon the subsequent grantee, stating that the 
intent of the parties “no matter how clearly expressed, does not make the 
covenant binding upon subsequent purchasers.”85 
In Westland Oil, the Texas Supreme Court clearly held that the AMI in 
that case did run with the land.86  The court initially noted that for a 
covenant to run with the land, there must be privity of estate between the 
parties, meaning that there must be “a mutual or successive relationship to 
the same rights of property” which the court found existed in that case 
because of the assignment of leasehold.87  The court further held that the 
AMI touched and concerned the land, and after acknowledging that the tests 
for making this determination “are far from absolute”, the court held that 
“the promise to convey the prescribed interests in the leases [covered by the 
AMI agreement] clearly affected the nature and value of the estate 
conveyed . . . . It burdened the promisor’s estate and could be considered to 
have rendered it less valuable.”88  Thus, the court concluded that the 
obligations imposed by the AMI did run with the land. 
The Westland case was criticized in a thorough Baylor Law Review 
note written by Angus Earl McSwain.89  McSwain began by acknowledging 
that the issue of covenants running with the land was a difficult one, noting 
that decisions on the issue “often state the general rule and conclude that the 
 
83. Id. ¶ 10, 771 N.W.2d at 286. 
84. Id. ¶ 13, 771 N.W.2d at 287. 
85. Id.  
86. 637 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1982). 
87. Id. at 910-11. 
88. Id. at 911. 
89. McSwain, supra note 65, at 629.  As noted in Section V(A), McSwain also criticized the 
Westland court’s holding with regard to notice.  Id. at 643. 
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covenant either does or does not meet the requirement.  These decisions do 
not often explain the application of the general statements to the facts at 
hand, rather, their arguments beg the question . . . .”90  The basic question, 
McSwain concluded, was whether the legal interest in the land of the 
promisor was made more or less valuable by the performance of the 
promise.91  He contended the AMI did not touch and concern the land 
involved in Westland because the primary effect of an AMI “is to require 
the conveyance of other lands.”92 
Grimes v. Walsh and Watts, Incorporated,93 a Texas Court of Appeals 
case that was decided the year after Westland, suggests at least one 
limitation that Texas courts might impose on the Westland holding.  In 
Grimes, the court held that an AMI between an assignor and assignee of a 
farmout was not binding upon a subsequent assignee of an interest in the 
farmout where the lease that was originally subject to the farmout had 
expired and the subsequent assignee took a new lease from the lessor.  The 
court agreed with the trial court that the AMI was a personal covenant 
between the parties and not a covenant running with the land.94  The court 
distinguished Westland, noting that unlike in Westland, in the case before it 
there was not a “mutual or successive relationship” as to the property in 
question, since the original lease had terminated.95  It should be noted that 
the AMI involved in Grimes was an Override AMI, but that did not appear 
to be a factor in the court’s decision. 
A similar result was reached in Mountain West Mines Incorporated v. 
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company,96 a federal case in Wyoming that involved 
an Override AMI under which Mountain West Mines (“Mountain West”) 
was to receive an overriding royalty interest in any uranium properties that 
were acquired by Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. (“Cleveland-Cliffs”) in an area 
described as the Powder River Basin.97  Cleveland-Cliffs had acquired 
certain properties, and later conveyed them to other parties (the 
“Assignees”).98  Mountain West claimed that, under the AMI, it was 
entitled to be assigned its override in any properties subsequently acquired 
 
90. Id. at 636. 
91. Id. at 637. 
92. Id. at 641 (emphasis in original). 
93. 649 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. App. 1983). 
94. Id. at 726, 728. 
95. Id. at 728. 
96. 376 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (D. Wyo. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 470 
F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2006). 
97. Mountain West, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 1300. 
98. Id. at 1300-01. 
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by the Assignees.99  The district court rejected this argument, holding that 
the AMI was not a covenant running with the land.  The court distinguished 
Westland on the grounds that, in that case, “the original parties to the 
agreement had an interest in the land when the covenant was made, and the 
subsequent party obtained an interest in that land subject to the covenant 
from one of the original parties.”100  The court also found that it was not the 
intent of the parties that the AMI burden successors in interest.101  Again, 
the fact that the AMI in that case was an Override AMI did not appear to be 
a direct factor in the court’s decision. 
It is also worth noting that the mere fact that an AMI is deemed to be a 
covenant running with the land does not necessarily mean that it will be 
binding upon an assignee of an interest covered by the AMI.  In Rio Gas 
Company v. MidCon Gas Services Corporation,102 Stallion Oil Co. 
(“Stallion”) was a party to three separate participation agreements with:  (1) 
Rio Gas Company (“Rio”); (2) MidCon Gas Services Corp. (“MidCon”); 
and (3) H.H. McJunkin, Jr. (“McJunkin”).103  At issue was whether MidCon 
was bound by an AMI in the Stallion/Rio and Stallion/McJunkin 
agreements, even though it was not a party to those agreements by virtue of 
the fact that it was assigned certain leases by Stallion under the 
Stallion/MidCon agreement.104  The court expressly acknowledged that the 
AMI in the Stallion/Rio and Stallion/McJunkin agreements might have been 
a covenant running with the land, but held that under the terms of the 
agreements, MidCon was not bound by the AMI as an assignee of leases 
that were subject to those agreements, since it was not an “assign” for the 
purposes of the AMI clause.105 
2. Golden v. SM Energy Company, and the Question of Whether 
a Successor or Assign Otherwise Agreed to be Bound 
Even if the AMI is a personal covenant that does not run with the land, 
this does not fully answer the question of whether it will be binding upon 
successors and assigns.  In addressing this question, I believe it is initially 
necessary to address some potential confusion created by the fact that, in 
addressing the question of whether an AMI is binding upon successors, 
 
99. Id. at 1301. 
100. Id. at 1307. 
101. Id. at 1308.  The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court, focusing primarily on its 
conclusion that it was not the intent of the parties that the AMI burden successors in interest.  
Mountain West, 470 F.2d at 951-52. 
102. 1999 WL 333152 (Tex. App. May 27, 1999). 
103. Rio Gas Co., 1999 WL 333152, at *1. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at *6. 
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many authorities focus solely on the question of whether the AMI is a 
covenant that runs with the land.  In fact, they often state the question of 
whether the AMI is binding upon successors in interest as being entirely 
dependent upon whether the AMI is a covenant that runs with the land.  For 
example, Terry Cross, in his excellent article on the various restrictions on 
alienation that may burden oil and gas properties, states “an AMI is of 
limited value if a party can transfer its ownership position in an area free 
and clear of the AMI obligations, so most AMIs expressly extend to 
‘successors and assigns.’  However, in order to actually bind successors, a 
covenant must actually ‘run with the land.’”106 
I would submit, however, that this is not a correct statement of the law, 
or at least that it is not complete.  In fact, an AMI will be binding upon 
successor and assigns if it is a covenant running with the land, but also, if 
the successors or assigns, either expressly or by implication, assume the 
rights and obligations of the AMI.  Clearly there is nothing that precludes a 
party from agreeing to be bound by the terms of an AMI in the same way 
that a party can agree to be bound by any other contractual terms. 
Some of the confusion around this issue may be created by the rule that 
the intent of the parties to a covenant is not sufficient to change such 
covenant from a personal one to one that runs with the land.  For example, 
in Beeter v. Sawyer Disposal, discussed above, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court stated: 
The essence of the district court’s holding is that, regardless of the 
label placed upon the six-percent provision, the original parties’ 
intent will be controlling on the question of whether the covenant 
is binding on subsequent purchasers.  This conclusion is in direct 
contradiction to the settled principle that the parties’ intent, no 
matter how clearly expressed, cannot make a personal covenant 
run with the land and bind subsequent purchasers.107 
The above statement of the law is correct.  In determining whether a 
covenant contained in an agreement involving real property will be binding 
upon successor owners in that property, the fact that the parties to the 
 
106. Cross, supra note 2, at 218.  See also Thanheiser, supra note 5, at 10 (“In order for [an 
AMI] to attach to a transfer of the leases, the AMI obligation must be considered a covenant 
running with the land and not a covenant that is personal in nature.”).  Indeed, in a prior paper on 
AMIs, the author himself stated, “As a general rule, in order to binding on the successors and 
assigns of the parties thereto, an AMI must be deemed to be a covenant with the land.”  
Lansdown, supra note 5, at 8. 
107. 2009 ND 153, ¶ 12, 771 N.W.2d 282, 286.  See also Mountain West Mines, Inc. v. 
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 376 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305 (D. Wyo. 2005); Lingle Water Users’ 
Ass’n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 297 P. 385, 389 (Wyo. 1931) (“the intention of the 
original parties to a contract alone cannot create a covenant running with the land . . .”). 
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original agreement may have intended it to be binding upon successors 
does not make the covenant one that will run with the land, or otherwise 
make it binding upon successor in interest.  This does not mean, however, 
that such successors cannot agree to be bound by such a covenant.  In that 
case, it is the intent of the successors to be bound that will be determinative, 
not the intent of the original parties to the agreement. 
Slawson Exploration Company v. Vintage Petroleum Incorporated,108 a 
federal Court of Appeals case construing Kansas law, involved a 
participation agreement that included an AMI between Slawson and Oryx 
Energy Company.  Slawson drilled a well pursuant to the agreement, and 
later sold its interest in the well to Vintage by a conveyance that recited that 
it covered the leases upon which the well was located and all rights in any 
agreements “in any way related thereto.”109  Oryx recompleted the well,110 
and acquired additional leases to cover the larger spacing unit that was 
established for the recompleted well.  Slawson filed suit, claiming that it, 
not Vintage, was entitled to participate in the additional leases.  The court 
found that, since Slawson’s rights under the participation agreement were 
related to the well, Slawson had assigned those rights to Vintage.111  The 
court in Slawson did not even mention the question of whether the AMI 
under the participation agreement was a covenant running with the land, 
making it clear that Slawson and Vintage could agree that the rights and 
obligations of the AMI were conveyed to Vintage when Slawson conveyed 
its interest in the well. 
Similarly, in Wuellner Oil and Gas, Incorporated v. EnCana Oil & Gas 
Incorporated,112 the court was faced with a claim by Wuellner against 
EnCana, under an Override AMI, that Wuellner was entitled to its override 
under certain oil and gas leases taken by EnCana after the original party to 
the Override AMI had assigned its interest in oil and gas leases covered by 
the AMI to EnCana.  In its first opinion, the court noted that the oil and gas 
leases that were assigned were “real rights” and that “[o]bligations 
 
108. 78 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1996). 
109. Id. at 1481. 
110. Although the opinion does not expressly state this, it appears that Oryx took over 
operation of the well from Slawson, and that the interest conveyed by Slawson to Vintage was 
therefore a non-operating interest. 
111. The court rejected an argument by Slawson that language in Exhibit A to its assignment 
to Vintage, restricting the assignment to the existing spacing unit for the well, indicated an intent 
to exclude the participation agreement from the assignment.  It noted that although the language in 
Exhibit A rendered the language in the Assignment ambiguous, it could nevertheless conclude that 
the intent of the parties was that Slawson’s participation rights be conveyed to Vintage.  Id. at 
1482-83. 
112. 2013 WL 1289047 (W.D. La. Mar. 26, 2013), clarifying the opinion in 861 F. Supp. 2d 
775 (W.D. La. 2012). 
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correlative and incidental to real rights are ‘real obligations’ and they pass 
automatically to the successor to the real right to which they are 
correlative.”113  However, the court further held that personal obligations 
that related to real rights did not run with the assignment of the real right, 
and that the obligation to assign overrides in future leases was a personal 
right.114  The court went on to hold that the language of the assignment to 
EnCana was unambiguous and that it did not provide for EnCana to assume 
any obligations that were not transferred in the assignment.115  Thus, the 
court clearly recognized that, even though the AMI was not a covenant that 
ran with the leases, an assignee of those leases could agree to assume the 
obligations, although the court found that such an assumption had not 
occurred in the case before it.116 
It should be noted that a dispute can also arise when an original party to 
an AMI asserts that its rights were not conveyed when it conveyed its 
interest in the leases within the area covered by the AMI.  This occurred in 
Crowder v. Tri-C Resources, Incorporated.117  In that case Crowder, one of 
the parties to an AMI that had conveyed its interest in all of the leases that 
the parties had originally acquired within the AMI, asserted that it was 
entitled to share in leases that were later acquired by the other party.  
Apparently, the parties did not even raise the issue of whether the AMI was 
a covenant running with the land, and the court found that it was clear under 
the language of Crowder’s assignment that he had conveyed all of his rights 
and interests under the AMI.118 
As these cases demonstrate, even if the rights and obligations of an 
AMI are held not to run with oil and gas leases that were within the AMI, 
an assignment of those leases may convey those rights and obligations if 
that is shown to be the intent of the parties to the assignment.  This point 
was illustrated with regard to North Dakota law by the recent North Dakota 
Supreme Court case of Golden v. SM Energy Company, a case that involved 
 
113. 861 F. Supp. 2d at 780. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 785. 
116. In a subsequent opinion, the court addressed Wuellner’s contention that even if it was 
not entitled to its override on all leases taken by EnCana in the AMI, it was entitled to its 
overriding royalty on replacements of leases that were originally covered by the assignment.  
Acknowledging that its earlier opinion had not been clear as to whether EnCana did not intend to 
assume any personal obligations or only that EnCana did not intend to assume any obligations that 
were unrelated to the assigned leases, the court held that Wuellner had a “colorable claim” to the 
overriding royalty on replacement leases.  EnCana, 2013 WL 1289047 at *3.  The court went on 
to reject this claim, however, finding that the assignment did not evidence an intent by EnCana to 
assume the assignor’s obligation to assign an overriding royalty on replacement leases.  Id. at *7. 
117. 821 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App. 1991). 
118. Id. at 398. 
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an Override AMI.119  A simplified description of the facts in that case is as 
follows:  A.G. Golden (“Golden”) entered into a letter agreement under 
which it conveyed certain oil and gas leases in McKenzie County, North 
Dakota to Universal Resources Corporation (“Universal”), reserving a four 
percent overriding royalty interest.  The letter agreement contained a 
designation of a joint area of interest and provided, among other things, that 
if Universal acquired any oil and gas leases in the designated area, it would 
assign Golden a four percent override therein.120  The court acknowledged 
that this type of clause was commonly referred to in the oil and gas industry 
as an AMI.121 
Subsequently, Universal sold its interest in the oil and gas leases to 
Tipperary Petroleum Company (“Tipperary”) by an assignment and bill of 
sale that “included a provision that Universal was assigning ‘all right, title 
and interest of Assignor in and to. . . all operating agreements, joint venture 
agreements, partnership agreements, and other contracts, to the extent that 
they relate to any of the [interests conveyed].’”122  Tipperary subsequently 
acquired an interest in a lease within the AMI that the parties referred to as 
the “Federal Lease.”  Thereafter, Tipperary assigned its interest in the lands 
and agreements in question to Nance Petroleum Corporation, under an 
assignment and bill of sale that “provided that Nance ‘assumes all of 
Assignor’s duties, liabilities and obligations relating to the Assets to which 
Assignor was a party or by which it was bound on and after the date 
hereof.’”123  Nance subsequently merged with SM Energy Company 
(“SM”).  At issue was whether SM was obligated to pay Golden the four 
percent overriding royalty on the Federal Lease. 
The trial court found that, as a matter of law, SM was obligated to pay 
a four percent overriding royalty on the Federal Lease to Golden and the 
other plaintiffs in the case.124  Interestingly, the parties agreed “that the 
AMI clause is not a covenant that runs with the land, but is a personal 
covenant that is enforceable only between the original parties to the 
agreement.”125  Therefore, they, and the North Dakota Supreme Court, 
agreed that the question was whether SM had “agreed to be bound by the 
 
119. 2013 ND 17, 826 N.W.2d 610. 
120. Id. ¶ 2, 826 N.W.2d at 613. 
121. Id. ¶ 9, 826 N.W.2d at 615. 
122. Id. ¶ 3, 826 N.W.2d at 614. 
123. Id.  
124. Id. ¶ 5.  Although the opinion does not expressly say so, presumably the other plaintiffs 
were parties to which Golden had assigned portions of the overriding royalty interest.  Herein, 
they will collectively be referred to as “Golden.” 
125. Id. at 615.  It is likely that Golden elected to forego the argument that the covenant ran 
with the land, based on the holding in the Beeter case, discussed supra note 82. 
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AMI clause under the law of assignments.”126  The court recognized that the 
question of whether the AMI was a covenant running with the land was not 
dispositive of the question of whether it was binding on successors and 
assigns. 
In addressing the question of whether the AMI was binding under the 
law of assignments, the parties focused on the language in assignment to 
SM’s predecessor in interest which provided “Assignor . . . does hereby 
grant, sell, assign, convey, and deliver unto Assignee, all right, title and 
interest of Assignor in and to . . . all operating agreements, joint venture 
agreements, partnership agreements, and other contracts, to the extent that 
they relate to any of the Assets.”127  Golden argued, and the trial court 
agreed, that the reference to other contracts that relate to the conveyed 
leases included the letter agreement, which provide for the overriding 
royalty.  SM argued that the provision unambiguously established that its 
predecessor did not assume the obligations of the AMI because the 
language reflected the parties’ intent to limit the assignment of any 
agreement to the extent that it related to one of the leases previously 
assigned. Therefore, the AMI clause only related to properties that might 
subsequently be acquired by SM’s predecessor and not to property acquired 
by SM.  The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected both the position of 
Golden and the trial court and the position of SM, concluding instead that 
the provisions of the relevant documents were ambiguous.128 
The trial court also concluded that summary judgment in Golden’s 
favor was appropriate because the SM’s predecessor had constructive 
knowledge of the letter agreement that provided for the AMI, due to the fact 
it was recorded.  The court acknowledged that SM had constructive notice 
of the provisions of the agreement since it was duly recorded; however, the 
court concluded that such constructive notice did not constitute an 
agreement to be bound by the terms of the AMI.129 
Finally, the trial court ruled that SM was bound by the terms of the 
letter agreement under North Dakota statute, which provided that the 
“voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a 
consent to all the obligations arising from it so far as the facts are known or 
ought to be known to the person accepting.”130  In response to this 
argument, the Supreme Court held: 
 
126. Id. 
127. Id. ¶ 12, 826 N.W.2d at 616-17. 
128. Id. ¶ 13, 826 N.W.2d at 617. 
129. Id. ¶ 14, 826 N.W.2d at 617. 
130. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-25 (2013). 
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The court’s conclusion that the mere act of entering into a 
transaction itself is the voluntary acceptance of the benefit of the 
transaction turns the law of assignment on its head.  This 
construction of the statute turns the AMI clause, as well as any 
other personal covenant, into a covenant that runs with the land 
and obliterates the requirement that an assignee consent to be 
responsible for the obligations of the assignor.131 
The court stated that the statute in question “obviously contemplates 
extrinsic evidence of conduct after completion of the transaction that 
suggests a voluntary acceptance of the benefit of the transaction,” and that 
neither the district court, nor Golden had put forth evidence of conduct on 
the part of SM that was inconsistent with its interpretation of the 
agreement.132  Further the court noted that the question of whether a party 
had voluntarily accepted the benefits of a transaction is better suited for a 
trier of fact than for summary judgment. 
Following the discussion of the issues described above, the Supreme 
Court noted, “[s]ummary judgment should not be used to conduct mini-
trials of factual issues.”133  Based on its conclusions discussed above, the 
Supreme Court concluded that because the provision of the agreement that 
was in dispute “permits reasonable differing interpretations” summary 
judgment was inappropriate.  Thus, the Court remanded the case to the trial 
court for a determination of the parties’ intentions.134 
3. The Current State of the Law 
It is safe to say that Golden confirms that in North Dakota an AMI will 
generally not be deemed a covenant running with the land, and that this 
result will be obtained regardless of the parties’ intent.  Thus, a party to an 
AMI cannot argue that the assignee of an oil and gas interest owned by 
another party to the AMI is bound by the terms of the AMI because it is a 
covenant running with the land.  Golden also makes it clear, however, that 
this does not mean that an AMI will never be binding on the assignee in that 
situation; the question is whether the assignee contractually agreed to be 
bound by the terms of the AMI.  Thus, if Company A and Company B are 
parties to an AMI, Company A conveys to Company C its interest in some 
oil and gas interests which were subject to the AMI and the conveyance 
expressly provides that Company C agrees to be bound by the terms of the 
 
131. 2013 ND 17, ¶ 16, 826 N.W.2d at 618. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. ¶ 18, 826 N.W.2d at 618. 
134. Id. 
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AMI, that agreement will be binding.  In addition, Company C may agree 
by implication to be bound, but as the Golden case makes clear, the 
question of whether this is the case will generally be an issue of fact to be 
determined by the trial court, based on the relevant evidence. 
It is also safe to say that not all jurisdictions treat this issue the way it is 
treated in North Dakota.  As discussed above, the Texas Supreme Court 
held in Westland Oil that an AMI was a covenant running with the land, but 
this result was criticized and distinguished in the Walsh and Watts cases.  It 
seems that the law in Texas regarding this area may be subject to further 
development. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given what may fairly be described as the recent explosion of the oil 
and gas industry in North Dakota, it is safe to say that AMIs will continue 
to be used extensively in the state.  Along with the many benefits of this 
increased activity, however, is the unfortunate side effect of a substantially 
increased pressure to “get the deal done,” which can result in pressure on 
attorneys to move quickly, cut corners, and be less careful about drafting 
documents, including AMIs.  This pressure is a fact of life and is not easily 
ignored.  That said, attorneys, and all of the parties involved in a deal, 
should be mindful of the price that may be paid for careless drafting and for 
otherwise not devoting the time to insure that a deal is properly papered.  
The expenses and other burdens resulting from litigation over these issues 
are clearly enough of an incentive for parties to exercise care in this area, 
but an even greater incentive may be the avoidance of the uncertainty that 
can result from such disputes.  When parties are preparing to spend 
millions, or even tens of millions of dollars on a drilling program, not 
knowing who is entitled to what interest can be a crippling burden. 
As discussed in this Article, careful drafting by attorneys can generally 
avoid issues that arise concerning the application of the statue of frauds and 
the rule against perpetuities to an AMI.  Careful drafting by attorneys can 
also ensure that their documentation reflects the intent of their clients with 
regard to the question of whether the AMI is binding on successors and 
assigns, and avoid the type of prolonged litigation that occurred in Golden.  
I would encourage oil and gas attorneys to do their best to explain to clients 
that a little effort spent now can avoid considerable heartache down the 
road. 
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APPENDIX:  SAMPLE AMI PROVISION 
SECTION ___ AREA OF MUTUAL INTEREST: An Area of 
Mutual Interest, hereinafter referred to as “AMI” is hereby created by and 
between the parties hereto, and shall be comprised of all lands described 
and outlined on Exhibit “___” attached to this Agreement.  This AMI shall 
be subject to the following terms and conditions. 
A. Definitions.  For the purpose of this Section, the following terms 
shall have the meanings hereinafter set forth: 
1. “Mineral Interest or Interests” shall include any oil and gas leases of 
any nonproductive horizons contained therein, any unleased mineral interest 
or any farmouts or options or contractual rights to acquire the same, 
provided that it is expressly understood and agreed that Mineral Interest 
shall not include any “producing interest” which is understood to be the 
productive horizon in any lands that are included in any spacing unit or 
proration unit or any pooled or unitized area upon which is located one or 
more wells capable of producing oil and/or gas in paying quantities.  It is 
agreed that if any party shall acquire an interest which includes a Mineral 
Interest and Productive Interest, the consideration for such acquisition shall 
be apportioned between the two types of interests, based on a fair market 
value, and the terms hereof shall apply to the acquired nonproductive 
Mineral Interest. 
2. “Acquisition Cost or Costs” shall include bonuses and all other 
expenditures related to the acquisition of a Mineral Interest or Interests, 
including without limitation expenditures for contract brokers, abstracts, 
and outside attorneys and, in the case of options and contractual rights, shall 
include an assumption by the Non-Acquiring Party of its proportionate part 
of all burdens imposed on the Acquiring Party by the related contract, but 
shall not include any charges for Acquiring Party’s its own personnel. 
B. Any-Party May Acquire.  Any party may proceed to lease or 
otherwise acquire Mineral Interests within the AMI. 
C. Notification Upon Acquiring Oil and Gas Rights.  In the event 
one of the parties hereto (the “Acquiring Party”) acquires any Mineral 
Interest lying within the Area of Mutual Interest, it shall promptly notify the 
other parties hereto (the “Non-Acquiring Party” whether one or more) in 
writing of such acquisition.  Such notice shall include a full description of 
the Mineral Interest so acquired.  A copy of the instrument by which such 
rights were acquired by the Acquiring Party together with, by way of 
example but not of limitation, copies of the leases, abstracts, title memos, 
assignments, subleases, farmouts or other contracts affecting the Mineral 
Interest; and the Acquisition Cost, including an itemized statement thereof. 
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D. Option to Participate.  Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the 
notice referred to in Paragraph C, the Non-Acquiring Party may elect to 
acquire its proportionate interest in the Mineral Interest so acquired by 
notifying the Acquiring Party in writing of such election.  The proportionate 




Promptly after the acceptance of the offered Mineral Interest by the 
Acquiring Party, the Acquiring Party shall invoice the Non-Acquiring Party 
for its proportionate share of the Acquisition Costs.  The Non-Acquiring 
Party shall immediately reimburse the Acquiring Party for its share of the 
Acquisition Costs, as reflected by the invoice.  Upon receipt of such 
reimbursement, the Acquiring Party shall execute and deliver an appropriate 
assignment to the Non-Acquiring Party.  Such assignment shall be on a 
form mutually acceptable to the parties, shall be made without warranty of 
title, and shall contain no special provisions.  If the Acquiring Party does 
not receive the amount due from the Non-Acquiring Party within thirty (30) 
days after the receipt by the Non-Acquiring Party of the invoice for its 
costs, the Acquiring Party may, at its election, give written notice to such 
delinquent Party that the failure of the Acquiring Party to receive the 
amount due within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of such notice by the 
delinquent Non-Acquiring Party shall constitute a withdrawal by the 
delinquent Non-Acquiring Party shall no longer have the right to acquire an 
interest in the offered Mineral Interest.  Unless the delinquent Party pays 
the amount due within said forty-eight (48) hours period, the delinquent 
Party shall have no right to acquire an interest in the offered Mineral 
Interest. 
E. Election not to Participate.  If a Non-Acquiring Party elects not to 
acquire its interest in an offered Mineral Interest, said Mineral Interest (the 
“Excluded Mineral Interest”), shall be excluded from the AMI.  If the 
Acquiring Party shall not have received actual written notice of the election 
of the Non-Acquiring Party to acquire its proportionate interest within the 
thirty (30) day period pursuant to Paragraph D, such failure shall constitute 
an election by such Non-Acquiring Party to not acquire its proportionate 
part of the Mineral Interest. 
F. Lands Partially Outside AMI.  If the Mineral Interest covers lands 
both within and out of the AMI, the Acquiring Party shall offer the entire 
Mineral Interest to the Non-Acquiring Party.  If the Non-Acquiring Party 
acquires its proportionate interest in the lands lying outside of the AMI such 
lands shall become subject to the terms of this Agreement. 
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G. No Warranty.  Any assignment made by the Acquiring Party shall 
be made free and clear of any burdens placed thereon by the Acquiring 
Party but otherwise shall be made without warranty of title, either express 
or implied, even to the return of the purchase price.  The assignment shall 
be made and accepted subject to, and the Non-Acquiring Party shall 
expressly assume its portion of, all of the obligations of the Acquiring 
Party. 
H. Term.  This Area of Mutual Interest shall remain in force and effect 
during the period that this Agreement is in effect, and for a period of 
______ (__) years thereafter. 
 
